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In the discipline of International Relations (IR), realism is a school of thought 
that emphasises the competitive and conflictual side of international relations. 
Realism’s roots are often said to be found in some of humankind’s earliest 
historical writings, particularly Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, 
which raged between 431 and 404 BCE. Thucydides, writing over two 
thousand years ago, was not a ‘realist’ because IR theory did not exist in 
named form until the twentieth century. However, when looking back from a 
contemporary vantage point, theorists detected many similarities in the 
thought patterns and behaviours of the ancient world and the modern world. 
They then drew on his writings, and that of others, to lend weight to the idea 
that there was a timeless theory spanning all recorded human history. That 
theory was named ‘realism’.
The basics of realism
The first assumption of realism is that the nation-state (usually abbreviated to 
‘state’) is the principle actor in international relations. Other bodies exist, such 
as individuals and organisations, but their power is limited. Second, the state 
is a unitary actor. National interests, especially in times of war, lead the state 
to speak and act with one voice. Third, decision-makers are rational actors in 
the sense that rational decision-making leads to the pursuit of the national 
interest. Here, taking actions that would make your state weak or vulnerable 
would not be rational. Realism suggests that all leaders, no matter what their 
political persuasion, recognise this as they attempt to manage their state’s 
affairs in order to survive in a competitive environment. Finally, states live in a 
context of anarchy – that is, in the absence of anyone being in charge 
internationally. The often-used analogy of there being ‘no one to call’ in an 
international emergency helps to underline this point. Within our own states 
we typically have police forces, militaries, courts and so on. In an emergency, 
there is an expectation that these institutions will ‘do something’. 
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Internationally, there is no clear expectation of anyone or anything ‘doing 
something’ as there is no established hierarchy. Therefore, states can 
ultimately only rely on themselves.
As realism frequently draws on examples from the past, there is a great deal 
of emphasis on the idea that humans are essentially held hostage to 
repetitive patterns of behaviour determined by their nature. Central to that 
assumption is the view that human beings are egoistic and desire power. 
Realists believe that our selfishness, our appetite for power and our inability 
to trust others leads to predictable outcomes. Perhaps this is why war has 
been so common throughout recorded history. Since individuals are 
organised into states, human nature impacts on state behaviour. In that 
respect, Niccolò Machiavelli focused on how the basic human characteristics 
influence the security of the state. And in his time, leaders were usually male, 
which also influences the realist account of politics. In The Prince (1532), 
Machiavelli stressed that a leader’s primary concern is to promote national 
security. In order to successfully perform this task, the leader needs to be 
alert and cope effectively with internal as well as external threats to his rule; 
he needs to be a lion and a fox. Power (the Lion) and deception (the Fox) are 
crucial tools for the conduct of foreign policy. In Machiavelli’s view, rulers 
obey the ‘ethics of responsibility’ rather than the conventional religious 
morality that guides the average citizen – that is, they should be good when 
they can, but they must also be willing to use violence when necessary to 
guarantee the survival of the state.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Hans Morgenthau (1948) sought to 
develop a comprehensive international theory as he believed that politics, like 
society in general, is governed by laws that have roots in human nature. His 
concern was to clarify the relationship between interests and morality in 
international politics, and his work drew heavily on the insights of historical 
figures such as Thucydides and Machiavelli. In contrast to more optimistically 
minded idealists who expected international tensions to be resolved through 
open negotiations marked by goodwill, Morgenthau set out an approach that 
emphasised power over morality. Indeed, morality was portrayed as 
something that should be avoided in policymaking. In Morgenthau’s account, 
every political action is directed towards keeping, increasing or demonstrating 
power. The thinking is that policies based on morality or idealism can lead to 
weakness – and possibly the destruction or domination of a state by a 
competitor. In this sense pursuing the national interest is ‘amoral’ – meaning 
that it is not subject to calculations of morality.
In Theory of International Politics (1979), Kenneth Waltz modernised IR 
theory by moving realism away from its unprovable (albeit persuasive) 
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assumptions about human nature. His theoretical contribution was termed 
‘neorealism’ or ‘structural realism’ because he emphasised the notion of 
‘structure’ in his explanation. Rather than a state’s decisions and actions 
being based on human nature, they are arrived at via a simple formula. First, 
all states are constrained by existing in an international anarchic system (this 
is the structure). Second, any course of action they pursue is based on their 
relative power when measured against other states. So, Waltz offered a 
version of realism that recommended that theorists examine the 
characteristics of the international system for answers rather than delve into 
flaws in human nature. In doing so, he sparked a new era in IR theory that 
attempted to use social scientific methods rather than political theory (or 
philosophical) methods. The difference is that Waltz’s variables (international 
anarchy, how much power a state has, etc.) can be empirically/physically 
measured. Ideas like human nature are assumptions based on certain 
philosophical views that cannot be measured in the same way.
Realists believe that their theory most closely describes the image of world 
politics held by practitioners of statecraft. For this reason, realism, perhaps 
more than any other IR theory, is often utilised in the world of policymaking – 
echoing Machiavelli’s desire to write a manual to guide leaders. However, 
realism’s critics argue that realists can help perpetuate the violent and 
confrontational world that they describe. By assuming the uncooperative and 
egoistic nature of humankind and the absence of hierarchy in the state 
system, realists encourage leaders to act in ways based on suspicion, power 
and force. Realism can thus be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy. More 
directly, realism is often criticised as excessively pessimistic, since it sees the 
confrontational nature of the international system as inevitable. However, 
according to realists, leaders are faced with endless constraints and few 
opportunities for cooperation. Thus, they can do little to escape the reality of 
power politics. For a realist, facing the reality of one’s predicament is not 
pessimism – it is prudence. The realist account of international relations 
stresses that the possibility of peaceful change, or in fact any type of change, 
is limited. For a leader to rely on such an idealistic outcome would be folly.
Perhaps because it is designed to explain repetition and a timeless pattern of 
behaviour, realism was not able to predict or explain a major recent 
transformation of the international system: the end of the Cold War between 
the United States of America (US) and the Soviet Union in 1991. When the 
Cold War ended, international politics underwent rapid change that pointed to 
a new era of limited competition between states and abundant opportunities 
for cooperation. This transformation prompted the emergence of an optimistic 
vision of world politics that discarded realism as ‘old thinking’. Realists are 
also accused of focusing too much on the state as a solid unit, ultimately 
overlooking other actors and forces within the state and also ignoring 
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international issues not directly connected to the survival of the state. For 
example, the Cold War ended because ordinary citizens in Soviet-controlled 
nations in Eastern Europe decided to rebel against existing power structures. 
This rebellion swept from one country to another within the Soviet Union’s 
vast empire, resulting in its gradual collapse between 1989 and 1991. 
Realism’s toolbox did not and does not account for such events: the actions 
of ordinary citizens (or international organisations, for that matter) have no 
major part in its calculations. This is due to the state-centred nature of the 
thinking that realism is built upon. It views states as solid pool balls bouncing 
around a table – never stopping to look inside each pool ball to see what it 
comprises and why it moves the way it does. Realists recognise the 
importance of these criticisms, but tend to see events such as the collapse of 
the Soviet Union as exceptions to the normal pattern of things.
Many critics of realism focus on one of its central strategies in the 
management of world affairs – an idea called ‘the balance of power’. This 
describes a situation in which states are continuously making choices to 
increase their own capabilities while undermining the capabilities of others. 
This generates a ‘balance’ of sorts as (theoretically) no state is permitted to 
get too powerful within the international system. If a state attempts to push its 
luck and grow too much, like Nazi Germany in the 1930s, it will trigger a war 
because other states will form an alliance to try to defeat it – that is, restore a 
balance. This balance of power system is one of the reasons why 
international relations is anarchic. No single state has been able to become a 
global power and unite the world under its direct rule. Hence, realism talks 
frequently about the importance of flexible alliances as a way of ensuring 
survival. These alliances are determined less by political or cultural 
similarities among states and more by the need to find fair-weather friends, or 
‘enemies of my enemy’. This may help to explain why the US and the Soviet 
Union were allied during the Second World War (1939–1945): they both saw 
a similar threat from a rising Germany and sought to balance it. Yet within a 
couple of years of the war ending, the nations had become bitter enemies and 
the balance of power started to shift again as new alliances were formed 
during what became known as the Cold War (1947–1991). While realists 
describe the balance of power as a prudent strategy to manage an insecure 
world, critics see it as a way of legitimising war and aggression.
Despite these criticisms, realism remains central within the field of IR theory, 
with most other theories concerned (at least in part) with critiquing it. For that 
reason, it would be inappropriate to write a textbook on IR theory without 
covering realism in the first chapter. In addition, realism continues to offer 
many important insights about the world of policymaking due to its history of 
offering tools of statecraft to policymakers.
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Realism and the Islamic State Group
The Islamic State group (also known as IS, Daesh, ISIS or ISIL) is a militant 
group that follows a fundamentalist doctrine of Sunni Islam. In June 2014, the 
group published a document where it claimed to have traced the lineage of its 
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, back to the prophet Muhammad. The group 
then appointed al-Baghdadi its ‘caliph’. As caliph, al-Baghdadi demanded the 
allegiance of devout Muslims worldwide and the group and its supporters set 
about conducting a range of extreme and barbaric acts. Many of these were 
targeted at cities in Western nations such as Melbourne, Manchester and 
Paris – which has led to the issue becoming a global one. Ultimately, the 
intent is to create an Islamic State (or Caliphate) in geopolitical, cultural and 
political terms and to deter (via the use of terrorism and extreme actions) 
Western or regional powers from interfering with this process. Of course, this 
means that existing states’ territory is under threat. Although the Islamic State 
group considers itself a state, due to its actions it has been defined as a 
terrorist organisation by virtually all of the world’s states and international 
organisations. Islamic religious leaders have also condemned the group’s 
ideology and actions. Despite it not being an officially recognised state, by 
taking and holding territory in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State group clearly 
possessed aspects of statehood. The major part of efforts to fight the Islamic 
State group has comprised airstrikes against its positions, combined with 
other military strategies such as using allied local forces to retake territory 
(most notably in Iraq). This suggests that war is considered the most effective 
method of counterbalancing the increasing power of terrorism in the Middle 
East and neutralising the threat that the Islamic State group poses not only to 
Western states but also to states in the region. So, while transnational 
terrorism, such as that practised by the Islamic State group, is a relatively 
new threat in international relations, states have relied on old strategies 
consistent with realism to deal with it.
States ultimately count on self-help for guaranteeing their own security. Within 
this context, realists have two main strategies for managing insecurity: the 
balance of power and deterrence. The balance of power relies on strategic, 
flexible alliances, while deterrence relies on the threat (or the use) of 
significant force. Both are in evidence in this case. First, the loose coalition of 
states that attacked the Islamic State group – states such as the US, Russia 
and France – relied on various fair-weather alliances with regional powers 
such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. At the same time, they downplayed 
the role of international organisations because agreeing action in places such 
as the United Nations is difficult due to state rivalry. Second, deterring an 
enemy with overwhelming, superior force (or the threat of it) was perceived as 
the quickest method to regain control over the territories under Islamic State’s 
rule. The obvious disproportionality of Islamic State’s military forces when 
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compared with the military forces of the US, France or Russia seems to 
confirm the rationality of the decision – which again harks back to realism’s 
emphasis on the importance of concepts like deterrence, but also on viewing 
states as rational actors. However, the rational actor approach presupposes 
that the enemy – even if a terrorist group – is also a rational actor who would 
choose a course of action in which the benefits outweigh the risks. Via this 
point, we can see that while the actions of a terrorist group might appear 
irrational, they can be interpreted otherwise. From a realist perspective, the 
Islamic State group, by spreading terror, is using the limited means at its 
disposal to counterbalance Western influence in Iraq and Syria. The 
substantial collateral damage of a full military offensive is evidently not a 
concern for the group’s commanders for two main reasons, both of which may 
serve to enhance their power. First, it would contribute to fuelling anti-
Western sentiment throughout the Middle East as local populations become 
the target of foreign aggression. Second, the feeling of injustice prompted by 
these attacks creates an opportunity for the spontaneous recruitment of 
fighters who would be willing to die to validate the group’s aims – this is 
equally true for those within the immediate region and those internationally 
who fall prey to Islamic State propaganda on the internet.
It is for reasons such as those unpacked in this case, in regions that are as 
complex as the Middle East, that realists recommend extreme caution 
regarding when and where a state uses its military power. It is easy when 
viewing realism to see it as a warmongering theory. For example, on reading 
the first half of the paragraph above you might feel that realism would support 
an attack on the Islamic State group. But when you read the second half of 
the paragraph you will find that the same theory recommends extreme 
caution. The key point in understanding realism is that it is a theory that 
argues that unsavoury actions like war are necessary tools of statecraft in an 
imperfect world and leaders must use them when it is in the national interest. 
This is wholly rational in a world where the survival of the state is pre-
eminent. After all, if one’s state ceases to exist due to attack or internal 
collapse, then all other political objectives cease to have much practical 
relevance. That being said, a leader must be extremely cautious when 
deciding where and when to use military power. It is worth noting that the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, undertaken as part of the Global War on Terror, was 
opposed by most leading realists as a misuse of power that would not serve 
US national interests. This was due to the possibility that the disproportionate 
use of US military force would cause blowback and resentment in the region. 
Indeed, in this case, realism yielded strong results as a tool of analysis, as 
the rise of the Islamic State group in the years after the Iraq invasion 
demonstrated.
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Conclusion 
Realism is a theory that claims to explain the reality of international politics. It 
emphasises the constraints on politics that result from humankind’s egoistic 
nature and the absence of a central authority above the state. For realists, the 
highest goal is the survival of the state, which explains why states’ actions are 
judged according to the ethics of responsibility rather than by moral 
principles. The dominance of realism has generated a significant strand of 
literature criticising its main tenets. However, despite the value of the 
criticisms, which will be explored in the rest of this book, realism continues to 
provide valuable insights and remains an important analytical tool for every 
student of International Relations.
